In an assessment of the Ukraine War with Russia, the former Dean of SAIS and Robert E. Osgood Professor Eliot Cohen breaks down the successes and failures of military analysts in the context of the Russian aggression against Ukraine.

Overall, there was a general consensus among analysts that Ukraine was under-experienced, ill-equipped, and apathetic, while Russia was vastly stronger than Ukraine, had more firepower, artillery, a military doctrine, and an extremely mobile mechanized force. So how did they get it so wrong?

Cohen asks us to imagine the war from different perspectives. From the outside point of view, the war began in 2022 but to Ukrainians it started in 2014; for Vladimir Putin it began in 1991, with the breakup of the Soviet Union. A comprehensive understanding of the complicated history of the region and the relations between Russia and Ukraine are crucial for effective military analysis and predictions. What the expert community seemed to have gotten right, according to Cohen, is the fact that war was imminent, and that Russia was dedicated to asserting its domination of Ukraine and to some extent, its reincorporation into a newer version of the Russian empire.

The list of what analysts got wrong however, is rather long. Ukraine surprised the world with its military prowess and was able to recover quickly more than half of the land it lost during the original invasion. The Russian air force has practically irrelevant to field operations towards the latter half of the war. Moreover, Russian cyber-operations seem to have had little effect on Ukrainian operations. Russia has suffered heavier losses than Ukraine. Ukraine has proven military analysts wrong via its ability to take advantage of the element of surprise, mobilize its forces effectively, exploit military intelligence, and, importantly, strong leadership and a highly-motivated rank-and-file.

Referring to Daniel Kahneman's book "Thinking, Fast and Slow," Cohen paints a scenario representative of Kahneman's "availability heuristic." If one asks a stranger whether a shark attack or a fragment of an airplane falling out of the sky is more of a danger to their lives, the response would usually be a shark attack because it's the most readily available and easiest thing that comes to mind. In the case of the war in Ukraine, because of the comparisons in numbers of troops, artillery, and technology analysts have made over the years, there is a bias for military analysts to conclude that Russia would win. An understanding of Ukraine's resilience, passion, and dedication, and the leadership skills of President Volodomyr Zelensky would have helped military analysts obtain a more optimistic outlook on Ukraine's strength in the conflict. Clearly, the fact that Ukrainians would consider this war an existential fight was not sufficiently appreciated. According to Cohen, unlike historians military analysts tend to underestimate the roles of individuals and their personalities. Their susceptibility to intellectual bias and groupthink is also a problem. It is essential that military education and training should focus on history alongside the study of war.

In regards to the path forward, Cohen sees this war to be the start of a fundamental shift in the relationship between the Western world and Russia. We must come to terms with the fact that this is a different world, and a major global discontinuity. He imagines the war might end in a stalemate; however, if so, it would likely just be a ceasefire as the next Russian administration would undoubtedly seek revenge. Cohen ends the discussion with a powerful quote by Winston Churchill urging us to "always remember, however sure you are that you could easily win, that there would not be a war if the other man did not think he also had a chance."



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Eliot Cohen is the Robert E. Osgood Professor at the Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) where he has taught since 1990. He served as Dean of SAIS from 2019 to 2021.

Cohen received his BA and PhD degrees from Harvard University and after teaching there and at the Naval War College founded the Strategic Studies program at SAIS. His books include The Big Stick (2017), Conquered into Liberty (2011), and Supreme Command (2002). In addition to public service in the Department of Defense he served as Counselor of the Department of State from 2007 to 2009. He writes frequently for major newspapers and is a contributing writer at The Atlantic.