"Those who shoot first, die next," states Josef Joffe, professor of the Practice of International Affairs and Senior Fellow of the Kissinger Center as he discusses the nuclear taboo in today's conflict with Russia and its threats of tactical nuclear weapons. Joffe asserts that in this conflict, Putin has decided act as a madman, in order to project an unpredictability, and irrationality, to promote fear and caution among his adversaries. His main argument is: Putin's game is to pretend insanity, to bank of the "rationality of irrationality;" hence this threats are not credible. Better to intimidate than to incinerate, which might threaten Russia itself.

A flashback to the Cold War helps us best understand this situation. In an arms race with weapons that are seen as merely tactical now, both sides were always aware of the mutually assured destruction nuclear weapons would bring about. The attack on Hiroshima and Nagasaki only confirmed the devastation that would visit the world. eared. This period of existential tension has left behind an enduring lesson. We no longer need "a crystal ball" as Joffe states, to show us what would happen if Russia or the US were to break the nuclear taboo.

Going back to the eve of World War I, no one could predict the outcome with 20 million dead and the fall of four empires (Tsarist, Wilhelmine, Ottoman and Austrian). We don't need a crystal ball to see what nuclear war would do. Nuclear weapons do not discriminate and would affect everybody beyond the borders of their intended victims, with tens of millions of lives at risk. Although Putin seems to threaten only "tactical" rather "strategic" weapons, Joffe argues that tactical war would soon escalate into a strategic one, especially since the largest tactical weapon today packs ten times the destructive force of the Hiroshima bomb.

Joffe further affirms that Putin prudently avoids concrete, tangible threats; these remain diffuse. Putin perfectly exemplifies the Madman Theory of international politics – or the "rationality of irrationality." Play the lunatics in order to win without a general war. And don't tie your hands, by threatening nukes here and now, which would force him into nuclear war. Playing the madman is more economical and far less risks than to act as one. The point is to terrorize short of nuclear war. Why are his threats not so credible? If he actually did want to use tactical nukes, U.S. intelligence would have recognized the tell-tale signs – like taking warheads out of their bunkers, mounting them on delivery vehicles and dispersing them. This, thankfully, is not happening.

On the other hand, the West is acting rationally. Don't provoke, don't ready your own tactical arsenals, don't wade into the conflict directly. The West is striking a balance between asserting will and unleashing war, which would trigger incalculable, uncontrollable escalation.

In a nuclear setting, there is a thin line, where one step beyond might trigger Armageddon. To prevent miscalculation and misperception, there is a constant flow of backchannel communication between Washington and Moscow. In a world of 13,000 nuclear weapons between the U.S. and Russia, even the use of one might trigger mutual destruction. So, both sides are incredibly wary of breaching the line. In our days, the best course is to remain cautious, resist without direct intervention, and understand Putin's strategy of psychological warfare.

There is another, non-strategic point to ponder. Amidst rising inflation and energy shortages n, the West has legitimacy on its side. It is trying to resist Russian imperialism, to protect civilians and to preserve a 77 years-old European order no longer based on conquest. Thus, the West is on "the better side of history" as Joffe states. To defend is legitimate, to attack is not. Hence, he West scrupulously avoids direct intervention. Add a historical point. Nuclear powers have fought against non-nuclear states. But never, ever have the superpowers confronted each other directly. Why not? Because it is a lose-lose game.



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Josef Joffe is Professor of the Practice of International Affairs and Senior Fellow of the Kissinger Center, and has a long history with Johns Hopkins, where he earned his MA and later taught nuclear strategy in the mid-1980s. Joffe was also educated at Swarthmore (BA), the College of Europe and Harvard (PhD in Government).

His career has been divided between journalism and academia, Europe and the United States. He has taught at SAIS, Harvard, Stanford and Munich University, was twice Regent Fellow at the University of California and a Visiting Lecturer at Princeton and Darthmouth. Joffe has held research positions at the Woodrow Wilson Center, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Institute for International Studies at Stanford and given guest lectures at many universities, ranging from Amherst to Zurich University. He has been a Distinguished Fellow at Stanford's Hoover Institution since 2004.

In Germany, Joffe has served as editorial page editor at Süddeutsche Zeitung (Munich) and editor of the weekly Die Zeit (Hamburg). He has had columns, essays and book reviews in: The Wall Street Journal, New York Times, Washington Post, Guardian, Times, Financial Times, Time, Newsweek, New Republic, Politico, Atlantic, New York Review of Books and Commentary.

He has published scholarly contributions in Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, International Security and The American Interest, which he co-founded with SAIS scholars Eliot Cohen and Frank Fukuyama. In 2020, he co-founded the successor magazine American Purpose.