Presidential Elections Will Consolidate Russian Autocracy

Vladimir Putin will win the Russian presidential election, to be held 15–17 March 2024. Contenders Vladislav Davankov (Noviy Lyudey, New People), Leonid Slutskiy (LDPR, Liberal Democratic Party of Russia), and Nikolay Kharitonov (KPRF, Communist Party of the Russian Federation) will not challenge Vladimir Putin's stronghold over the Russian state, his control of the media, and his high popularity among Russians. The election will further consolidate Vladimir Putin's autocratic rule over Russia's politics and economy.

Analysis

Political Control and Suppression

Putin will centralize political power through opposition suppression. Putin will cite national security to silence the opposition following electoral and "democratic" legitimization. To this end, Putin has already eliminated meaningful political opposition. He used the Central Election Committee to disqualify Boris Nadezhdin by rejecting 15% of the signatures he needed to run for office. Extralegal suppression through detention, sanction, or assassination remains potent. Media control allows Putin to prevent opposition proliferation and solidarity. The Russian opposition may struggle to mobilize after the election due to waning public political concern.

Putin will continue to use the political isolation from the West to consolidate his political control over Russia. President Putin's address to the Federal Assembly on February 29, 2024, underscores his ambitions to challenge Western resolve in 2024. He will continue to forcefully integrate the occupied Ukrainian territories into the Russian state, a policy backed by renewed reliance on nuclear threats. The continued incongruity between Russian and Western aims will sustain Russia's alienation, strengthening Putin's dependence on China and complicating future dialogues between Brussels, Washington, and Moscow.

Individual civilian protests will be suppressed, as they have been for decades. Crackdowns on protests over Navalny's death and anti-war protests generally will disincentivize the general public from entering opposition action, reinforcing self-censure and apathy.

Economic Consolidation and Potential Collapse

The Russian economy has survived Western sanctions due to expanding Russian oil exports, strategic sanction dodging, and reliance on partners like Iran, China, and North Korea. Continued Russian access to SWIFT, increased diamond exports, and gold-backed currency have also assisted Russia's economic endurance. Western sanctions are not without effect, however. The European Union noted that the sanctions have drastically diminished Russian foreign revenues and have negatively affected the country's supply chains and technological sectors. The US Treasury also noted a 5% contraction in Russia's economic growth. Russia's adjustment to sanctions has minimized their effects: following a GDP drop in 2022, the Russian economy has grown in 2024.

The Russian economy is predicted to suffer and even collapse in a long-term struggle. The systemic downturn in private markets and enterprises has reinforced state apparati and afforded Putin direct economic control. Over the coming years, the Russian Central Bank will impose tight monetary policy controls to cap inflation at 4%, though the bank expects inflation will speed up to 11–13% in the event of stricter Western sanctions. This tightened monetary policy, through restricting the ruble's supply, will limit investment for Russians and lead to long-term denigration at the expense of short-term currency appreciation, preventing private sector growth.

Further, consumers will continue to suffer from limited trade flows despite sanction-dodging. Consumers will face limited choice and higher prices for Western goods, as shadow channels are insufficient to meet the population's demand. Energy exports do not compensate for shrinking Western exports in foodstuffs, clothing, and machinery, which will generate a massive trade deficit. This will undercut Russian war spending and limit Russian wartime endurance, provided the Western sanctions persist.

The Russian economy's military investment ties it to Putin's political successes: failure in Ukraine would decimate the wartime economy and budgets. Russian federal spending will continue the war, with 1/3 of the 2024 budget being allocated for "national defense," suggesting no intention of limiting advances through Avdiivka and Chasiv Yar. Such spending will not prevent the long-term collapse of Russian industry and consumer sectors; the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute projects the annual growth of the Russian GDP to be 2-3% amidst shrinking percentages of agricultural production and capital investment into 2026. Weakened economic growth in non-conflict sectors makes the economy dependent on war-time success, enabling Putin to take extraordinary measures for political and economic security.

Russian producers will continue to utilize natural energy, leaving Russian elites high and dry. Only total economic collapse would interrupt the export market model, and Putin can depend on these producers to run his state.

Conclusion

Vladimir Putin will exhaust Russian social and economic capacity following the election. With no elite challenges and shattered opposition, Putin's war-time economy will devote further resources to the war in Ukraine and his political system as a means of personal reinforcement until the system collapses. Putin's authority over Russian industries and the inability to sustain holistic Russian economic stability offers worrying implications for the Russian population. The election, much like the Russian invasion of Ukraine, will be Putin's opportunity to centralize power, but such acts will continue to put the health of his state at risk.



Harrison Quinn is a Master of Arts in International Relations candidate at JHU-SAIS. His main interests focus on international law and politics, EU-American relations, and heterodox economics. He seeks interdisciplinary analyses of contemporary political order through legal and social frameworks. He obtained his BA in Economics, History, and German Studies from Bucknell University.