Professor Wolfgang Sporrer emphasizes the importance of small, incremental negotiations in Ukraine to bring what he calls a 'gigantic tragedy' to an end. He begins his presentation with a background on the Maidan Revolution, and then explains the negotiations that led to the Minsk agreements, the content of Minsk II, and its successes and failures.

The Maidan Revolution was primarily directed against President Yanukovych and the corruption of his regime. It was a mass movement, and though not always non-violent, it was never militarized. The Maidan pushed Yanukovych out of the country but was left with a constitutional discontinuity: he still claimed the presidency from abroad, and there was no constitutional provision providing a replacement procedure. Therefore, the next government initially rested on shallow legitimacy. As a result, when the militarized anti-Maidan movement arose largely in the east of Ukraine, the government was unable to respond with coordinated force, and as the conflict intensified the Ukrainian forces performed poorly.

Sporrer outlines three concentric circles that have contributed to conflict between Russia and Ukraine, while emphasizing that Russian aggression is the primary reason for the current war. The first circle consists of inner-Ukrainian conflict between those who have historically looked towards Russia and those who have primarily looked to the west. The second circle relates to bilateral tensions between Ukraine and Russia which stem from uncomfortable mutual dependencies and historical narratives. Finally, the international east-west tension forms the third circle. Russia sees Ukraine as its last tie to empire, an idea that the west rejects.

To halt the military conflict in 2014, two protocols arose from meetings in Minsk. Sporrer focuses on the second, during which leaders from France, Germany, Russia, and Ukraine gathered for a 28-hour meeting. The Package of Measures that emerged from this meeting was almost immediately violated when rebels with the support of Russia overran the city of Debaltseve just a few days after its signature. The agreement consisted of 13 points, all but two of which – hostage exchange and monitoring by the OSCE – were not, or only partially, implemented. However, Sporrer asserts that this process was not fruitless. It saved lives, reunited families, allowed for humanitarian ceasefires, and provided for an early warning system.

Despite these successes, there was no political solution. Sporrer identifies differences in expectations between Russia and Ukraine as a primary cause of this failure. Russia wanted a foothold in Ukraine to control Ukrainian politics, while Ukraine wanted to avoid exactly that type of Russian interference. Additionally, the agreement was weak technically and did not include workable verification mechanisms.

Finally, Sporrer identifies two perspectives on how to get out of this tragic situation. From above, considering the military, legal, and moral circumstances, it is clear that Ukrainian victory appears as the only fair option. However, seen from below, negotiators must search for a pragmatic solution that will minimize human suffering. Professor Sporrer suggests expanding the Istanbul Grain Initiative, which has shown that Ukrainians and Russians can together to find solutions to certain problems. This should serve as a starting point for other conversations that do not require concessions but could provide important benefits, such as implementation of humanitarian ceasefires, a slow restoration of trust as well as an early warning mechanism, therefore reducing the potential of escalation.

Russian-Western Relations: Where Now? Series

hosted by Professor Sergey Radchenko


Wolfgang Sporrer is a member of the Adjunct faculty at the Hertie School in Berlin, Germany.

Previously, Sporrer was head of the Human Dimension Department of the OSCE SMM in Kyiv, where he lead civilian aspects of conflict management and facilitated and promoted dialogue between the opposing sides. Prior to that, he was the head of the international oil and gas company OMV's representation in the Caspian region, where he spearheaded regional efforts to promote the Southern Gas Corridor for the EU. He also served as the Head of the Europa House of the European Commission in Baku/Azerbaijan and as Head of the Democratisation Department of the OSCE Presence in Albania. He has been a political adviser in the EU delegation in Moscow, and has had positions with the OSCE in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. Sporrer studied law at the University of Vienna, the Universite Catholique de Louvain La Neuve and the London School of Economics and Political Science, and holds a Diploma in International Relations from the Johns Hopkins University SAIS.