On February 23rd, 2025, Germany held its general election – seven months ahead of schedule, due to the collapse of the so-called traffic-light coalition. The new Bundestag bears little resemblance with the old one: the center-right CDU/CSU has once again become Germany's strongest party whereas the SPD reached an all-time low at 16.4%. The far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) doubled its vote share, reaching 20.8%. The liberal FDP, formerly part of the government, did not surpass the 5% threshold and will remain outside of parliament, whereas the far-left Die Linke gained substantially, especially compared to pre-election polling, reaching 8.7%. In a time of polycrisis, political systems are bound to undergo changes – and, as a consequence, so will Germany's foreign and domestic priorities. There was therefore plenty of material to discuss for the student-faculty panel that came together on the Friday after the election.
The (blue) elephant in the room was the AfD, which not only doubled its result but also crossed the 20% threshold. Some of these gains were likely due to its continued domination of the discourse on social media, where the only party that came close to the AfD's success was Die Linke. Notably, in an election that saw the highest voter turnout of the last 38 years, the AfD mobilized a large number of non-voters. The hopes of its political opponents that the nationalist-left Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW) would win over a significant part of the AfD's supporters and decrease its vote share did not come true. The panelists touched upon the complex historical and socio-economic dimensions behind the regional differences, with the AfD winning large parts of eastern Germany. They also concluded that the AfD is no longer a simple protest party and has managed to control much of the political discourse in Germany – especially on the topic of migration.
However, the panelists noted that there was a striking disparity in the political discourse on migration before and after the election. The parties had given little emphasis to migration in the aftermath of the election, said Professor Hartmut Mayer. This was surprising given that the issue had dominated the discourse during the campaign. The panel also emphasized the need for skilled immigrants, who Germany is increasingly relying on due to its aging population and the resulting challenges for its social security system. So far, it is not clear how the CDU and chancellor-in-waiting Friedrich Merz intend to attract skilled workers and provide relief to overburdened municipalities, Mayer said. A clearer strategy could emerge during the negotiations with the CDU's likely coalition partner, the SPD.
How the CDU handles migration may also be directly linked to how it seeks to address the rising popularity of the AfD. The far-right party has campaigned on radical anti-immigration rhetoric – for example by openly considering deporting people deemed insufficiently assimilated, including German citizens. In late 2023, leaders from the AfD and other far-right groups had discussed this idea under the euphemism of "remigration", as investigative journalists later revealed. But while these developments initially sparked large-scale protests, the AfD continued to rely on the concept during its campaign. The German electorate has not punished the AfD for its increasing radicalization. So far, the panel agreed, the CDU has lacked a clear strategy for rolling back the AfD's success.
Another strategic issue for the CDU will be government spending and debt. Merz and his party campaigned on a promise not to change the so-called debt brake, a constitutional amendment that limits the annual budget deficit to 0.35% of GDP. However, this has come under increasing scrutiny in the face of various spending pressures. These pressures include a sluggish economy, the deteriorating state of the country's infrastructure, and most importantly, defense. The need for increased defense spending – evident since the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine – has become even more urgent as U.S. President Donald Trump increasingly calls into question whether the U.S. would defend Europe in the event of an attack. Professor Mayer said that he expected Germany to increase its defense spending under Merz, but that it was unclear to what extent.
Finally, the panel discussed Germany's relationship with its European partners as a key issue for Merz's chancellorship. Merz has traditionally been committed to the transatlantic relationship and European cooperation. He expressed dismay when he declared on election night that the current U.S. administration was apparently indifferent to the fate of Europe. The panel expects that the current geopolitical shift will lead Merz to double down on Germany's ties within Europe, including a renaissance of Franco-German relations. Professor Hanns Maull pointed out that German foreign policy has long been in reaction to the United States' foreign policy. But the extensive checks-and-balances characteristic for the German system have led to only incremental policy changes, Professor Maull said. Whether Friedrich Merz can mobilize the large-scale action needed in these turbulent times will be the defining challenge of his term.
Update: Just hours after our panel, the world got to watch live a clash between U.S. President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. On March 4th, Friedrich Merz agreed with the SPD to exempt defense spending above 1% of GDP from the debt brake. For these changes to take effect, the coalition partners need a two-thirds majority in both the Bundestag and the Bundesrat. The chambers are expected to vote on the proposal on March 18th and March 21st, respectively.
