On December 2nd, 2025, SAIS Europe hosted Alexander Gabuev for a discussion how Russia's military strength, political resilience and strategic ambitions have evolved four years into the war against Ukraine, and what this balance implies for both negotiations and Europe's long-term security. Gabuev, Director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, drew on his background as a former Kremlin and diplomatic reporter and his research on Russian foreign policy and Sino-Russian relations to frame the war's strategic trajectory.

Gabuev began by assessing the current round of peace negotiations, arguing they are genuine but precarious. He placed the likelihood of an agreement at roughly ~40%, emphasizing that neither Russia nor Ukraine is facing imminent collapse and that both sides still possess the will and resources to continue fighting. As long as this remains true, diplomacy will be shaped by competing theories of victory rather than desperation.

He then outlined what he described as Russia's coherent and openly maximalist negotiating position. Putin's demands include permanent Ukrainian neutrality, territorial concessions in Donbas, limits on Ukraine's armed forces and the severing of military and intelligence ties between Ukraine and the West. Gabuev argued these are not opening bids designed to be traded away but reflect a belief in Moscow that time and pressure can eventually deliver all of them. The core question, in his view, is whether Ukraine emerges from the war able to defend itself. A settlement that strips Ukraine of credible military capacity would likely push the country toward political instability, economic implosion and renewed Russian leverage.

A central theme of the discussion was the problem of security guarantees. Gabuev distinguished between external guarantees offered by Western states and Ukraine's own deterrent capacity, expressing skepticism that formal Western guarantees would prove credible in practice given NATO's consistent reluctance to fight Russia directly. From Moscow's perspective, dismantling Ukraine's military independence matters far more than written assurances, because it would allow Russia to reassert pressure at a moment of its choosing.

Gabuev dismissed the idea that sanctions relief or renewed U.S.–Russia economic cooperation would materially alter Russian behavior. He noted that bilateral trade has always been limited and that political risk and weak legal protections make large-scale investment unlikely. Any meaningful Russian economic recovery would depend far more on Europe, particularly Germany. Yet Europe's rapid investment in LNG infrastructure and diversified energy supplies has sharply reduced dependence on Russian gas, weakening a source of leverage the Kremlin has long hoped to regain.

Turning to Ukraine's long-term outlook, Gabuev warned that the absence of credible security would block reconstruction and accelerate demographic decline. Millions of Ukrainians have already resettled abroad and without confidence in lasting security, neither private investment nor large-scale return migration is likely. A weakened Ukraine, he argued, would generate instability not only for Kyiv but also for Europe, including renewed refugee pressures and long-term economic strain.

He then broadened the analysis to European security as a whole, arguing that Putin views the war not simply as a conflict with Ukraine but as a confrontation with NATO and the post-Cold War order. A settlement perceived in Moscow as victory would encourage further risk-taking in areas where NATO's resolve appears uncertain, making pressure on the Baltic states or other exposed regions more plausible if Europe remains militarily underprepared.

The discussion also addressed China's role in shaping Russia's strategic position. Gabuev argued the war has weakened Russia in global terms while deepening its dependence on Beijing. China benefits from Russia's isolation and its increased willingness to accept junior-partner status, while also gaining a source of strategic distraction for the United States and Europe. Under these conditions, he saw little incentive for Beijing to push Moscow toward compromise.

Gabuev closed by stressing that Russia is neither collapsing nor positioned for decisive victory. Instead, it is becoming more militarized, more repressive, and more dependent on China, while Ukraine faces mounting pressure as manpower, resources, and external support strain over time. He warned that prolonged ambiguity in Western strategy risks producing the worst outcome, extended fighting followed by a settlement that leaves Ukraine weaker and Europe less secure.

---

hosted by Professor Sergey Radchenko


Alexander Gabuev is Director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center where he leads a renowned team of analysts who were formerly part of the Carnegie Moscow Center, which was forced to close by the Kremlin in early 2022 after nearly three decades of operation.

Gabuev's own research is focused on Russian foreign policy with particular focus on the impact of the war in Ukraine and the Sino-Russia relationship. Since joining Carnegie in 2015, Gabuev has contributed commentary and analysis to a wide range of publications, including the Financial Times, the Economist, the Wall Street Journal, and the New York Times.

Gabuev began his career as a journalist. He was a member of the editorial board of Kommersant and served as deputy editor in chief of Kommersant-Vlast, which at the time was one of Russia's most influential newsweeklies. Gabuev started his career at Kommersant in 2007 working as a senior diplomatic reporter, as a member of the Kremlin press corps, and as deputy foreign editor for Kommersant.

Gabuev has previously worked as a nonresident visiting research fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) and taught courses on Chinese energy policy and political culture at Moscow State University. In April-June 2018, Gabuev was a visiting scholar at Fudan University (Shanghai, China) where he taught courses on Sino-Russian relations. Gabuev is a Munich Young Leader of Munich Security Conference.